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Abstract Ex-post investigations of major terrorist attacks in Europe have highlighted 
the contradiction between the seemingly free movement of terrorists across Europe and 
the lack of Eu-wide intelligence sharing. in response, Eu policymakers have repeatedly 
promised to improve intelligence sharing across Europe, and some have even floated 
the idea that Europol should be turned into a centralised Eu criminal intelligence hub, 
akin to the uS Federal Bureau of investigation. in this article, i argue that despite the 
clear need for borderless intelligence sharing as a response to borderless terrorism, 
Europol is highly unlikely to become a genuine intelligence agency in the foresee-
able future. Experience to date with Europol suggests that it is one thing for Europe’s 
policymakers to make public promises to improve the fight against terrorism via better 
intelligence sharing across Europe, and quite another thing for them to persuade the 
relevant national agencies to comply.
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Introduction
The recent terrorist attacks in Belgium and France have once again highlighted the con-
tradiction between the seemingly free movement of terrorists across Europe and the 
lack of Eu-wide intelligence sharing. Due to their earlier criminal activities, most per-
petrators of the attacks in both paris and Brussels were known to the various security 
agencies in several Eu member states. For instance, the abdeslam brothers had run 
a café in Brussels that was notorious for drug peddling. in early 2015, Belgian police 
questioned them about a failed attempt to travel to Syria, but they were not detained. 
Soon after, Dutch police stopped them during a routine traffic check, fined them €70 
for carrying a small quantity of hashish and then released them because they were not 
listed in their national information system. allegedly neither the French security agen-
cies nor the Eu coordinating agency, Europol, were informed of either of these incidents 
prior to the paris terrorist attacks in november 2015 (La Baume and paravicini 2015). 
Similar stories of information non-sharing have emerged in the aftermath of other major 
terrorist attacks in Europe since the Madrid bombings in 2004. in response, Eu policy-
makers have repeatedly promised to improve intelligence sharing across Europe, and 
some have even floated the idea that Europol should be turned into a centralised Eu 
criminal intelligence hub, akin to the uS Federal Bureau of investigation (FBi) (Zimmer-
mann 2006, 135).
in this article, i argue that despite the clear need for borderless intelligence sharing 
as a response to borderless terrorism, Europol is highly unlikely to become a genuine 
intelligence agency in the foreseeable future. My research on Europol suggests that it is 
one thing for Europe’s politicians to make public promises to improve the fight against 
terrorism via better intelligence sharing across Europe, and quite another thing for them 
to persuade the relevant national agencies, over which politicians usually exercise less 
than perfect control, to comply.
The structure of this article is as follows. Brief accounts of Europol’s original mandate 
and its post-9/11 counterterrorism role are offered in the first section. Sections two and 
three review the key obstacles to Europol’s counterterrorism coordination efforts and 
counterterrorism intelligence sharing, respectively. The concluding section offers a dis-
cussion of the possible ways for Europol to add tangible value in the area of counterter-
rorism and a summary of the key reasons why none of these are likely to materialise in 
the foreseeable future.
Europol’s counterterrorism mandate
Europol started limited operations on 3 January 1994 in the form of the Europol Drugs 
unit. progressively, other areas of criminality were added to Europol’s mandate, includ-
ing countering terrorism. in the aftermath of 9/11, Europol’s counterterrorism mandate 
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was further expanded. a December 2002 Council Decision (Council of the European 
union 2003) specifically stipulated that each member state must ensure that at least the 
following intelligence information is communicated to Europol:
•  data which identify the person, group or entity;
•  acts under investigation and their specific circumstances;
•  links with other relevant cases of terrorist offences;
•  the use of communications technologies; and
•  the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The Decision also provided for the appointment of specialised services or magistrates 
within the police services and judicial authorities, urgent priority treatment of requests 
for mutual assistance concerning persons and groups included in the Eu terrorist list, 
and maximum access by the authorities of other member states to information on tar-
get persons and groups. in the last area, Europol’s role is unique as it offers ‘the only 
Eu-wide platform for multilateral exchange and analysis of personal data in relation to 
organized crime and terrorism via a secure network which is subject to strict regula-
tions on handling of data based on specific handling codes’ (ratzel 2007, 113). The 
emphasis on the exchange of data on terrorism was further reinforced in Council Deci-
sion 2005/671/JHa, which stipulated that there must be one point of contact within 
each member state that collates ‘all relevant information concerning and resulting from 
criminal investigation conducted by its law enforcement authorities’ and passes it on to 
Europol (Council of the European union 2005).
Europol also gained the authority to ask the police forces of Eu member states to 
launch investigations and to share information with the uS FBi and other third parties, 
including interpol, as well as with police forces in non-Eu states. information sharing 
and other forms of cooperation have also been progressively developed with other 
relevant Eu agencies, including the European anti-Fraud office (oLaF), the Euro-
pean police Chiefs Task Force and, perhaps most notably, Eurojust. Europol was also 
assigned to open and expand the terrorist ‘analysis work files’, created from informa-
tion and intelligence provided by the police forces and intelligence services of the Eu 
member states. a 24-hour counterterrorism alert unit has also been established within 
Europol, comprised of national liaison officers from police and intelligence services. 
in January 2015, a new European Counter Terrorism Centre was established within 
Europol. it is supposed to function as the central information hub in the fight against 
terrorism in the Eu, providing analysis for ongoing investigations and contributing to a 
coordinated reaction in the event of a major terrorist attack.
it is important to stress, however, that as with other international police organisations 
such as interpol, Europol is not an executive police force with the autonomous suprana-
tional authority to conduct its own investigations, undertake searches or arrest suspects. 
instead, the objectives of Europol are to improve the effectiveness of and cooperation 
among national police authorities in the Eu member states, primarily via facilitation of 
the exchange of information. unlike all other international police organisations, however, 
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Europol was not formed from the bottom up by police professionals, but is the result of 
a top-down decision by the political and legislative bodies of the Eu. This has had two 
important repercussions on Europol’s counterterrorism role. on the one hand, Europol 
is ‘characterized by a degree of autonomy to determine specific means and objectives 
of its policing and counterterrorist programs’ (Deflem 2006, 340). on the other hand, 
and most importantly for this article, the top-down political decision to establish Europol 
may at least partly explain the lack of will shown by some relevant national law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies to work with and through this Eu agency.
Obstacles to Europol’s counterterrorism 
coordination efforts
The impact of Europol’s counterterrorism measures is difficult to assess because there 
is relatively little information available publicly. Everything in this article is based on 
open, publicly accessible sources of information, complemented by interviews with 
relevant Europol experts (who preferred to remain anonymous). Moreover, the stand-
ard of comparison clearly matters when it comes to evaluating the added value of any 
type of policy. The problem is that despite the billions spent annually on counterterror-
ism, we still lack an adequate performance evaluation baseline from which to figure out 
what works and why. To some extent, this is due to the methodological difficulties of 
finding the right proxy indicators to complement the readily available, yet inherently 
limited quantitative criteria (such as the number of arrests or requests for assistance). 
Such criteria shed little light on the actual effects of counterterrorism measures on spe-
cific cultures, groups and individuals, and the most efficient counterterrorism measures 
in terms of increasing overall security may be problematic due to their impact on other 
important values such as liberty and justice (Guild and Geyer 2008).
nevertheless, based on Europol’s annual reports, which contain at least some 
systematic data, some observers have argued that Europol has begun to play an 
increasingly important role in the fight against terrorism since 9/11. in the area of infor-
mation sharing, however, even coordination has proven to be a difficult task. in part, this 
is because the political, administrative and judicial framework varies from one member 
state to another, which adds further impediments to effective information sharing and 
coordination. Moreover, according to a report by the European Commission (2004, 3), 
the free circulation of information is hindered by two additional obstacles:
The first is that the information tends to be compartmentalized at both organiza-
tional and legal levels. For example, it is divided between different ministries and 
services and is intended for use in different procedures, thereby affecting the 
nature and sensitivity of the information that can be handled by the services. The 
second obstacle is the lack of a clear policy on information channels, resulting in 
disagreement on the choice of channel and on how to handle sensitive and confi-
dential information.
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another obstacle Europol faces with respect to counterterrorism is the fact that in 
some Eu member states, terrorism is dealt with by police agencies, while in others intel-
ligence agencies are responsible for counterterrorism. Cooperation across intelligence 
and police agencies can be difficult because they tend to be interested in different types 
of information: ‘police institutions tend to be interested in specific information about 
suspects in order to make an arrest, whereas intelligence agencies are very broadly 
interested in general information without prosecutorial purposes’ (Deflem 2006, 351). 
Moreover, some experts have also argued that given their different esprit de corps, 
‘security services as a group do not think highly of police agencies and vice versa’ (Mül-
ler-wille 2008, 57). within the Eu, difficulties with both police and intelligence coopera-
tion are further compounded by the cultural and linguistic diversity that exists across the 
28 Eu member states.
More importantly, however, it seems that some do not necessarily welcome coordina-
tion from Brussels. Because of its top-down origins, the police forces and intelligence 
services of Eu member states have often viewed Europol with a great deal of suspicion, 
believing that it infringes on their authority and autonomy. as Europol’s former direc-
tor Jürgen Storbeck (archick 2002, 9) explains: ‘For a policeman, information about his 
own case is like property. He is even reluctant to give it to his chief or to another depart-
ment, let alone giving it to the regional or national services. For an international body 
like Europol, it is very difficult.’ However, as discussed in greater detail below, repre-
sentatives of Eu member states’ police and security agencies ‘do achieve cooperation 
in practical matters’ at meetings separate from those of the Eu ministers and Europol 
(Deflem 2006, 348).
Counterterrorism intelligence sharing: Europol 
as an optional bonus only?
intelligence sharing has arguably been one of the most problematic areas of the Eu’s 
counterterrorism efforts. while there appear to have been gradual improvements over 
time, Europol has certainly struggled to transcend the traditional obstacles to intelli-
gence sharing, and national security and law enforcement agencies are still too often 
reluctant to share ‘high-grade’, real-time intelligence on terrorism that can be acted 
on immediately. This is primarily due to the persistence of nationality in international 
policing and intelligence. although numerous Council decisions and Commission pro-
posals include an obligation for Eu member states to share information, in practical 
terms, this duty has had little impact because it cannot force member states’ authorities 
to share more information, that is, intelligence that has not previously been dissemi-
nated. This is also confirmed by Europol officials: ‘we know that [national] intelligence 
services cannot share personal-related and operational-related data with us because 
of their very strict data protection regimes and there is no use talking it over’ (interview 
with a Europol official, September 2009).
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in either case, information exchange with Europol headquarters is de facto voluntary, 
and the level of involvement from the various national units varies greatly from one Eu 
member state to another. Consequently, although the intelligence and analysis capaci-
ties at Europol headquarters have improved considerably since 9/11, the volume of data 
that officially reaches Europol remains relatively low. There are several reasons for this, 
including the defence of sovereignty in matters of ‘national security’, which is further 
buttressed by a culture of secrecy and the independence of national services, which 
fear that confidential sources and methods of work could be compromised if intelligence 
is widely shared. in the case of Europol, these fears are further exacerbated by the fact 
that prior to 9/11, this Eu agency was considered to be a law enforcement support unit 
only, while after 9/11, it was decided at the political level that Europol would support ‘all 
competent authorities, including the intelligence services, which were not necessarily 
ready for this change’ (interview with a Europol official, September 2009). as an alterna-
tive explanation, some analysts have suggested that intelligence is also ‘a “currency” to 
obtain other valuable information or political favors [and therefore] it is not appealing to 
share it on the basis of general rules with all Eu member states’ (Bossong 2008, 19). 
others have even argued that national security services may undermine community 
regimes by submitting low-quality information (argomaniz 2011, 227).
Furthermore, even when they formally participate in international agencies such 
as Europol, European police agencies may be reluctant to share information in the 
absence of several prerequisites, most importantly a sense of mutual trust and a shared 
expectation of positive outcomes. These, however, cannot simply be created by Eu 
legislation. Moreover, in practice there is a clear preference for bilateral cooperation, 
which many national agencies consider as ‘the most workable instrument’ from an intel-
ligence perspective (Council of the European union 2004, 19). as a consequence, 
‘Europol represents but an optional bonus, of which the member states can avail them-
selves at free will’ (Müller-wille 2004, 26).
an independent study ordered by the European Commission in 2007 provides another 
explanation for Europol’s shortcomings (John Howell & Co. 2007). The study suggests 
that the weakness of Eu intelligence exchange is due to the presence of an ‘elephant in 
the room’. The authors recognise that counterterrorism intelligence sharing among mem-
ber states takes place along two axes. The first axis consists of institutional actors, namely 
law enforcement, internal security, foreign intelligence agencies and policymakers. 
The second axis is geographical: global, regional and bilateral (including small-scale 
multilateral). The authors of the report claim that ‘one of the bilateral players, the uSa, 
is so significant as to represent a separate class of interaction’ (John Howell & Co. 
2007, 36). This is because the uS (a) has an outreach policy in counterterrorism, (b) 
actively engages Eu member states on policy formulation and implementation, (c) pro-
vides technical assistance in the form of training and equipment, and (d) exchanges 
data. as such, the uS ‘is a de facto intelligence hub to which most MS [member states] 
are in some way connected’, and the ‘Eu arrangements risk being crowded out by these 
relationships’ (John Howell & Co. 2007, 37).
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Finally, while formally supporting political initiatives at the Eu level, many Eu mem-
ber states simultaneously participate in numerous informal, practitioner-led multilateral 
networks (e.g. Club de Berne or the police working Group on Terrorism), often at the 
expense of supporting Europol (Bureš 2012). Because of their flexibility, relative inde-
pendence from national governments and ability to include a broad range of participants 
on an equal footing, it is generally assumed that these informal networks ‘are more 
suitable for tackling governance problems or achieving common goals than more hier-
archical and formal strategies’ (Den Boer et al. 2008, 103). Especially among profes-
sionals, informal horizontal cooperation arrangements are regarded as highly successful, 
pragmatic and flexible. in this light, it is hardly surprising that a number of studies con-
cerning intelligence sharing consider the preference of Eu member states for bilateral 
and informal multilateral arrangements to be natural and warn against hasty attempts to 
build supranational intelligence institutions (Benjamin 2005, 15; Müller-wille 2004, 35–6).
Concluding remarks: towards a European FBI?
according to Müller-wille (2004, 33), a supranational Eu agency adds value if
•  it produces something that is not, will not or cannot be produced at the national 
level; and
•  the responsibility for a certain form of intelligence product is transferred to the 
European level, that is, if the European unit can relieve national authorities.
at the moment, Europol fails to meet either of these two preconditions. in contrast 
to some other Eu agencies (e.g. the Eu Satellite Centre or the intelligence Division of 
the European Military Staff), the providers of intelligence to Europol are identical to its 
main customers—the national intelligence agencies of the member states. Currently, 
there is also ‘no Eu function that requires, let alone depends on, intelligence support 
from Europol’ (Müller-wille 2004, 31). This, in combination with the fact that no other 
unique responsibilities have been transferred from the national level to Europol, leads 
to a duplication that sets the limit for Europol’s intelligence role: ‘Simply put, whatever 
Europol does has to be produced at the national level as well’ (Müller-wille 2004). Mül-
ler-wille therefore argues that the incentive for Eu member states’ national agencies to 
feed Europol with intelligence is rather limited because they still carry full responsibility 
for producing the intelligence support required for national security and, as such, cannot 
be dependent on Europol:
no national service can argue that it failed to foil a terrorist plot because Europol 
did not do its job accurately. neither the government nor the public would accept 
such an explanation. Therefore, national services maintain the task of producing 
and providing national law enforcement authorities with accurate and complete 
intelligence. Hence, they cannot and will not rely on Europol’s contribution. (Müller-
wille 2004, 56)
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Since Europol’s work parallels the work of national agencies when it comes to infor-
mation analysis, and merely complements the bi- and multi-lateral cooperation arrange-
ments that predate it, it is understandable that many national agencies perceive 
information sharing via Europol as an extra burden rather than as adding value.
it is also worth remembering that it was primarily for political reasons that terrorism 
was not originally included in Europol’s agenda when it was created in 1994. Moreo-
ver, full consensus has not yet emerged on the role and future of Europol. while some 
Eu member states, including austria, Belgium and the netherlands, would indeed 
have liked to see Europol evolve into an organisation with an independent investiga-
tive role like the uS FBi, others, including Germany, France, italy, Spain and the uK, 
have opposed such an evolution, preferring instead to keep investigative authority at 
the national level with Europol acting as a coordinating body (Zimmermann 2006, 135). 
Disputes like this indicate that at least for some member states, it may still be too early 
to allow the Eu to have an influential role in traditionally state-specific areas such as 
policing, criminal justice and intelligence gathering. This was recently acknowledged by 
Europol’s director rob wainwright (Le Baume and paravicini 2015), who stated that 
while there is pressure on his agency to take on more of a ‘front-line’ role, it would be 
politically difficult to extend his organisation’s mandate beyond the role ascribed to it in 
the Lisbon Treaty, which is to support national law enforcement services by collecting, 
analysing and exchanging information.
Finally, it is important to note that in some cases, there may be good reasons for 
caution in sharing sensitive information with an Eu agency—in particular, for the intel-
ligence services the protection of sources is paramount; the originators of intelligence 
must be confident that the organisation with which it is shared is secure and that it will 
not be passed on to a third party without their permission. as aptly summarised in a 
report for the British House of Lords in the aftermath of the London terrorist attacks in 
2005:
Ensuring that agencies exchange information effectively cannot be achieved solely 
by agreeing general principles such as the principles of equivalent access and 
availability. Such principles can place a general obligation on agencies to share 
information but they cannot ensure that that happens without a build-up of knowl-
edge and mutual trust between the agencies (uK House of Lords, Eu Committee 
2005).
There is of course a possibility that over time Europol will succeed in convincing both 
the national policymakers and the relevant national security agencies that it can be 
trusted, even in the highly sensitive area of counterterrorism. However, the process of 
trust-building is likely to be rather long. after all, even in the uS, it took 132 years before 
the FBi was formally established in 1908.
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